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V I R G I N I A: 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS 
CHARLES RUTTER, as executor of 
the estate of Mildred Duncan 
v. 
Jones , Blechman , Woltz & Kelly, P.C . 
and 
John Tompkins, III, Esquire 
Serve : 
Herbert V. Kelly 
2nd Floor, 600 Thimble Shoals Boulevard 
Newport News, Virginia 23606 
and 
John Tompkins, III, Esquire 
Jones , Blechman , Woltz & Kelly, P . C. 
2nd Floor , 600 Thimble Shoals Boulevard 
Newport News , Virginia 23606 
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff , 
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1. The plaintiff , Charles M. Rutter, III as executor of the 
estate of Mildred Duncan, at all times ment ioned herein was a 
resident of Newport News , Virginia. 
2. The defendant, John T . Tompkins, III, Esquire, at all 
times mentione d herein was an attorney duly licensed under the 
laws of the State of Vi rgi nia to practice the profession of law. 
3. The defendant , Jones, Blechman, Woltz & Kelly, P.C . , at 
a ll times ment i oned herein was retained to provide legal services 
to Mildren Duncan and her estate . 
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4. Both defendants continued to provide l egal services to 
the decedent , Mildred Duncan, and to her estate following her 
death , for a consideration paid to them until March of 1998 . 
BREACH OF CONTRACT 
5 . Heretofore and on or about December 14 , 1993, defendants 
undertook for a consideration paid them to prepare and draft the 
last will and testament and revocable trust of Mildred Duncan , 
now deceased, and did accordingly prepare such instruments so 
entitled which Mildred Duncan subscribed, and which were signed 
by the requisite persons and number of witnesses. 
6. In consideration for her monies paid, Mildred Duncan 
retained the services of the defendants and specifically 
requested that they prepare a testamentary ins trument or 
instruments which effected, inter alia, her following intentions : ~ 
a . That 10 % of the residue of her estate be devised to 
Trinity United Methodist Church and Washington and Lee 
University as charitable bequests; j b. That a remembrance a mounting to about $5,000 
respectively be devised to Elvira Crawley and Clarence 
Ackers, her two housekeepers , provided that they were 
still in her employ at her death. 
7. Pursuant to said contract, defendants owed a duty to 
Mildred Duncan to advise her of all tax consequences of her 
decisions. Defendants also owed Mildred Duncan, and her estate 
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following her death , a duty to review all testamentary 
instruments and advise Mildred Duncan, and her estate following 
her death, of all tax consequences of the dispositions contained 
therein. 
8 . In an effort to effect Ms. Duncan's i ntent ions, the 
defendants prepared a "pour-over" last will and testament and 
corresponding revocable trust. Articles IV(B), IV(C) (1) and 
IV(C) (2) of said revocable trust read as follows in pertinent 
part: 
IV (B) : "The trustee shall distribute a cash sum to 
Elvira Crawley and Clarence Ackers, if they survive the 
Grantor and are in the employ of the Grantor at the 
Grantor's death . The Grantor intends that this bequest be a 
remembrance and may leave a suggested amount, but the amount 
of such bequest be entirely in the discretion of the 
Trustee . " 
IV (C) : "The remainder of the Trust Estate as then 
constituted shall be administered and distributed as 
follows: 
1 . Ten percent (10%) to the Washington & Lee 
University to set up a scholarship for deserving law 
students inmemory of the Grantor's husband, Thomas Dunca n . 
2. Ten percent (10%) to the Trinity Uni ted Methodist 




9. The above quoted language of the revocable trust of 
Mildred Duncan , prepared by defendants and executed on December 
1 4, 1993 along with her last will and testament, was wholly 
ineffectual to carry out said intentions of Mi ldred Duncan in 
that , as drafted, the amount of the bequests to Trinity United 
Methodist Church and Washington and Lee University were 
unascertainable at the time of her death; because the amounts of 
the devises to Elivra Crawley and Clarence Ackers were left 
solely to the discretion of the trustee pursuant to the 
provisions of Article IV(B) the numerical monetary value of the 
10% bequests to Trinity United Methodist Church and Washington 
and Lee University could not be determined at the decedent 's 
death. As a result, the bequests to Washington & Lee and Trinity 
United Methodist Church did not comport with the requirements set 
forth in Section 2055(a) of the federal tax code which relate to 
charitable tax deductions. 
10. Entirely because of the defendants ' negligence and lack 
of skill in drafting said instrument , Articles IV(B) , I V(C) (1) 
and IV(C) (2) of Mildred Duncan ' s aforementioned revocable trust 
were entirely ineffective to carry out the testator ' s intention 
that the bequests to Washington & Lee and Trinity United 
Methodist Church be charitable in nature and thus pass from her 
estate unencumbered by tax liability. 
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11. The fai lure of Articles IV(B), IV (C) (1) and IV(C) (2) of 
Mildren Duncan's said revocable trust to carry out the wishes of 
the testator constituted a breach of contract a s between Mildred 
Duncan, who is now deceased , and the defendants. 
12. As a re s ult of this breach of contract by defendants, 
and their fail ure to rectify the i r initia l mistakes, the es tate 
of Ms. Duncan incurred tax liabilities on the bequests to Trinity 
United Methodist Church and Washington and Lee University which 
amounted to $663,996.00. 
13. As a result of this breach of contract and t h e 
defendants' failed attempts to ameliorate its breach, the estate 
incurred additional and substantial legal and accounting fees 
that it would not have incurred but for the defendants' breach of 
con t ract. 
14 . Plaintiff , as executor of the estate of Mildred Duncan , 
is a p r oper party to bring the within action to recover from the 
defendants the sum of the a mount of damages which resulted from 
their breach of contract. 
NEGLIGENCE 
15. Counts 1- 12 are re - alleged in full as if fully set 
forth herein . 
16. Following the death of Mildred Duncan, the defendants 
continued to advise her e s tate regarding the implications of said 
"pour- over" will and corresponding revocable trust . 
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17. In accordance with their representation, the defendants 
had a duty to apprise her estate as to any p otential consequences 
arising from operation of said "pour- overu will and corresponding 
revocable trust . 
18. The defendants breached said duty in failing t o realize 
that the bequests to Elvira Crawley and Clarence Ackers, as 
drafted, disqualified the estate from receiving charitable 
deductions as to the bequests to Washingt on and Lee University 
and Trinity United Methodist Church; they fa iled to counsel the 
estate that the drafting error could be rect i fied if Elvira 
Crawley and Clarence Ackers disclaimed their bequests. 
19. As a proximate result of defendants' failure to so 
counsel the estate, disclaimers were not filed and the estate was 
disqualified from receiving charitable deductions as to the 
bequests to Washington and Lee University and Trinity Uni t ed 
Methodist Church . 
20 . On account of defendants' negligence, t he estate 
suffered substantial economic harm resulti ng from additional 
taxes , legal fees and accounting fees. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays that the court grant it judgment 
against the defendants in the sum of ONE MILLION DOLLARS 
($1,000,000), prejudgment interest from the date of the 
termination of defendants' services, and costs for damages 
resulting as aforesaid. 
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A Trial by Jury is Demanded. 
CHARLES M. RUTTER, III 
~-~ By Counsel 
Temple W. Cabell, Esquire 
Kenne ·C . Hirtz, Esquire 
Richard W. Schaffer , Esquire 
SCHAFFER & CABELL , P . C. 
Chesterman Place 
100 W. Franklin Street , Suite 200 
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Jones,BlechmanWoltz &Kelly, P.C. 
OF COUNSEL 
ARTliUR W. WOL rz; 
HERJIERT V. K.Ell Y 
RAYMOND H. SUTTt.E 
HARRY J. KOSTU 
B.M. MJUNER 
IW.PH M. COLOSTUI 
JOHN T. TOMPKINS. IU 
CONWAY H. SHEILD. IU 
EDWARD DWIGHT DAVID 
SVEIN J. LASSEN 
KENNETli B. MUROV 
HERBERT V. KEllY. JR. 
RICHARD B OONALOSON. JR. 
MERYl. D. MOORE 
ROBERT L FREEMAN. JR. 
Clay Hester, Sheriff 
224 26th Street 
Post Office Box 57 
Newport News, VA 23607 
Dear Sheriff Hester: 
Attorneys and Counselors ac Law 
SECOND FlOOR 
600 THI:14BLE SHOALS BOliLEVARD 
NEWPORT NEWS. VIRGINIA ll606 
I IK>41 87l·800l 
HARBOUR CENTRE 
l EATON STREET. SUITE 700 
HA.W'TON. VIRGINIA 23669 
( 11(>4 ) 72 2-2 966 
REPLYTo, Newport News 
April 12, 1988 
Writer•s Telephone No. 873-8027 
Alv.N D. JONES, 187719~ 
DANIEL SCHLOSSER. 191H971 
F.O. BLECHMAN. 1905--1986 
RlCHARD D. CAIV.N 
ROBERT A. SMAll 
HERBERT G. SMml, 0 
MJCHAfl B. WARE 
JEANNE BYRUM SELPH 
JAMES C. SMITH, JR. 
CHARLES PETER TENCH 
MOLLY BOYD JOSEPH 
SYDNEY K.. L WEST 
jlMESE L PENDERGRAFT 
DIRECT DIAL NO. 
NORFOLK NO. 62S-7llZ 
OUR Fll..E NO. 
In accordance with your recent letter and the prov1s1ons of Section 13 . 1-
637 of the Code of Virginia, I he reby designate Deborah R. Cowan or Wendy 
L. Nalvin as persons who may accept service of process for corporations 
of which I am t he Registered Agent. 
Very truly yours, 
JONES, BLECHMAN, \~OL TZ & KELLY, P. C. 
HV K/drc 
10 
VIRGINIA: IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS 
CHARLES RUTTER, as Executor of 
the Estate of Mildred DWlcan, 
Plaintiff, 
v. AT LAW NO. CL99-27424-VA 
JONES, BLECHMAN, WOLTZ & KELLY, P.C., 
and JOHN TOMPKINS, III, ESQUIRE, 
Defendants. 
DEMURRER 
NOW COME the defendants, by counsel, and state that the Motion for Judgment herein filed 






The plaintiff has no standing to bring this action. 
The plaintiff is not the proper party to bring this action. 
The plaintiff has not been damaged as a matter of law. 
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The plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be gr~ted. w 
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WHEREFORE, the defendants pray that their Demurrer be granted and this action be 





John Y. Pearson, Jr. 
Frank A. Edgar, Jr. 
WILLCOX & SAVAGE, P.C. 
1800 NationsBank Center 
Norfolk, VA 23510 
(7 57)628-55 00 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing Demurrer was mailed to: 
Temple W. Cabell, Esq. 
SCHAFFER & CABELL, P.C. 
Chesterman Place 
100 West Franklin Street, Suite 200 
Richmond, VA 23218 





VIRGINIA: IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS 
CHARLES RUTTER, as Executor of 
the Estate of Mildred Duncan, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JONES, BLECHMAN, WOLTZ & KELLY, P.C., 
and JOHN TOMPKINS, III, ESQUIRE, 
Defendants. 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that a hearing on the Demurrer filed by defendants Jones, 
Blechman, Woltz & Kelly, P.C., and John Tompkins, III, Esquire, will be held on Thursday, 
December 16, 1999, at 9:00a.m. or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard. 
PLEASE GOVERN YOURSELVES ACCORDINGLY. 
John Y. Pearson, Jr. 
Frank A. Edgar, Jr. 
Willcox & Savage, P.C. 
1800 Bank of America Center 
One Commercial Place 
Norfolk, VA 23510-2197 
(757) 628-5500 
(757) 628-5566 (fax) 
1-269570. 1/FAE:WAE 
9113/99 
JONES, BLECHMAN, WOLTZ & KELLY, P.C., 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing Notice of Hearing was mailed to: 
Temple W. Cabell, Esquire 
SCHAFFER & CABELL, P .C. 
Chesterman Place 
I 00 West Franklin Street, Suite 200 
Richmond, VA 23218 




VIRGINIA: IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS 
CHARLES RUTTER, as Executor of 
the Estate of Mildred Duncan, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JONES, BLECHMAN, WOLTZ & 
KELLY, P.C., 
and 
JOHN TOMPKINS, Ill, ESQUIRE, 
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DEFENDANTS' BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT 






. .) ... _ .... 
NOW COME defendants JONES, BLECHMAN, WOLTZ & KELLY, P.C., and JOHN 
TOMPKINS, III, ESQUIRE, by counsel, and in support of their Demurrer to the Motion for 
Judgment filed by plaintiff CHARLES RUTTER, AS EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF 
MILDRED DUNCAN (the "Executor"), state as follows: 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
In this case, the Executor ofthe Estate of Mildred Duncan has sued defendants John 
Tompkins, III, Esquire, and his law firm, Jones, Blechman, Woltz & Kelly, P.C. (the 




Motion for Judgment, the Defendants' negligence in drafting Ms. Duncan's will resulted in 
additional tax liability to the estate. See Motion for Judgment ~, 12, 20. 
The Executor's claims fai l as a matter of law, however, for several reasons. First, the 
Executor has no standing to prosecute a legal malpractice claim against the Defendants because 
the Executor was not in privity of contract with the Defendants. Second, the Executor is not a 
third-party beneficiary entitled to pursue a malpractice claim against the Defendants. Third, even 
if the Executor had standing to prosecute a malpractice claim against the Defendants on behalf of 
Ms. Duncan, the Demurrer still should be sustained because Ms. Duncan suffered no damage as a 
matter oflaw from the alleged malpractice. Finally, even if the Executor could bring a 
malpractice claim in its own behalf, it still cannot prove the element of damages as a matter of 
law. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE PLAINTIFF HAS NO STANDING TO BRING THIS ACTION 
In order to state a cause of action for legal malpractice, a plaintiff must allege the 
existence of an attorney-client relationship; that the relationship gave rise to a duty; that the 
attorney neglected or breached that duty; and that the neglect or breach was a proximate cause of 
the injury claimed. See,~, Gregory v. Hawkins, 251 Va. 471 (1996); Duvall, Blackburn, 
Hale & Downey v. Siddiqui, 243 Va. 494 (1992); Seward Int'l, Inc. v. Price Waterhouse, 239 
Va. 585 (1990). If the Executor in this case failed to allege or properly plead any one or more of 





In order to pursue a malpractice claim against the Defendants, the Executor must prove 
that he and the Defendants were in an attorney-client relationship at the time of the alleged 
jegligence. If no such relationship existed, then the Executor lacks standing to bring the action. 
j .S...ee Copenhaver v. Rogers, 238 Va. 361,366 ( 1989) ("[In] a case involving a claim solely for 
economic losses ... [i]t is settled in the Commonwealth that no cause of action exists ... absent 
privity of contract."). 
Here, Mildred Duncan retained the services of Mr. Tompkins and his law firm to draw 
her will. See Motion for Judgment~~ 5 and 6. At all times, Ms. Duncan was the only individual 
that maintained an attorney-client privilege with the Defendants. Mr. Rutter, the Executor, at no 
time prior to Ms. Duncan's death was in privity of contract with the Defendants. For that reason 
alone, the Executor may not maintain a malpractice action against the Defendants for their 
alleged negligent drafting ofDuncan's will. 
Moreover, there is no law in Virginia to support a contention that an executor is in privity 
with an attorney retained for the purposes of drafting a decedent's will. Authority from other 
jurisdictions that have addressed this question hold that this type of malpractice claim against an 
attorney fails as a matter of law because of the lack of privity between the executor and the 
attorney. See Deeb v. Johnson, 170 A.D. 2d 865 (N.Y. 1999) (holding that an executor is not in 
privity with the attorney in actions arising out of the drafting of the decedent's will). 
The United States Bankruptcy Court for Eastern District ofVirginia applied New York 
law and upheld the dismissal of a claim by an executor against an attorney for malpractice 




786 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1997). The Bankruptcy Court strongly defended the requirement of privity 
in a malpractice action: 
The complaint here cannot be viewed more favorably because it was commenced 
by Ms. Caldwell as Executrix of Ms. Hanes' Estate instead of individually as an 
intended beneficiary who suffered a Joss as a result of defendants alleged 
negligence. [citation omitted] The privity requirement would be rendered 
meaningless if it could be circumvented by the simple device of having a fiduciary 
appointed for the estate of the deceased client who would then commence the 
proceeding against he attorney on behalf of all, or some, of the beneficiaries of the 
estate. 
ld., 214 B.R. 786 n.33 (quoting In the Matter of Estate of Pascale, 644 N.Y.S.2d 877 (1996)). 
The requirement of privity simply prohibits the Executor in this case from pursuing the 
malpractice claims against Ms. Duncan's attorney. 
II. NEITHER THE EXECUTOR NOR THE ESTATE IS A THIRD-PARTY 
BENEFICIARY TO THE CONTRACT BETWEEN MS. DUNCAN AND THE 
DEFENDANTS 
Neither the Executor nor the Estate may assert a malpractice claim for the alleged 
negligent drafting of Duncan's will as a third-party beneficiary to the contract between Ms. 
Duncan and the Defendants. "In order to proceed on the third-party beneficiary contract theory , 
the party claiming the benefit must show that the parties to a contract 'clearly and definitely 
intended' to confer a benefit upon him." Copenhaver, 238 Va. at 367 (quoting Allen v. 
Lindstrom, 237 Va. 489, 500 (1989)). It is simply not enough that the contracting parties 
intended a third-party to benefit from the distributions outlined in the decedent's will. Id. at 368 
("There is a critical difference between being the intended beneficiary of an estate and being the 






In this case, the Executor does not allege that the contract between Duncan and the 
Defendants to draw her will was entered into to confer benefit on either the Executor or the 
Estate. In fact, the Executor pleads expressly that the Defendants entered into the contract " for a 
consideration paid them," see Motion for Judgment 1 5, and that Duncan entered into the contract 
for the "prepar[ation] and draft(ing of a] will and testament and revocable trust .... " Id. 
Because neither Duncan nor the Defendants entered into the attorney-client relationship for the 
purpose of conferring a benefit on either the Estate or the Executor, those entities do not have 
standing as a third-party beneficiary to prosecute a malpractice lawsuit against the Defendants. 
III. MS. DUNCAN SUSTAINED NO DAMAGES AS A MA TIER OF LAW 
Even if the Executor need not be in privity of contract with the Defendants to bring a 
malpractice action based on the alleged negligence in drafting Duncan's will, the Executor still is 
unable to prove any damages as a matter of law. At the time of her death, Ms. Duncan had 
suffered no damage as a result of the alleged malpractice. The damages claimed in this case 
allegedly arose only after Duncan's death in the form of additional tax liability resulting from the 
alleged negligent drafting of her will. This type of damage, however, is not recoverable by the 
Executor. See Deeb v. Johnson, 170 A.D. 2d 865, 866 (N.Y. 1991) ("Because the estate tax 
liability was not incurred until the decedent's death, decedent had no claim for damages to 
survive his death."). 
IV. THE EXECUTOR HAS NOT BEEN DAMAGED AS A MA TIER OF LAW 
Even if he could prosecute a malpractice claim on its own behalf, the Executor still 
cannot show any damages as a matter of law resulting from the alleged negligence. Virginia law 




result of alleged negligence, but also the extent of those damages. Allied Productions v. 
Duesterdick, 217 Va. 763 (1997) ("[I]n order to recover damages for the negligence of his 
attorney the client must prove the extent of the damages."). Furthermore, an attorney is only 
liable for the actual injuries to his client. Id. 
The Executor in this case has suffered no actual injuries. The Executor has suffered no 
losses from the alleged diminution of the estate that may have resulted from additional tax 
liability allegedly caused by the attorney's alleged negligence. Mali v. DeForest & Duer, 553 
N. Y.S.2d 391 (1990) (holding that an action by executor and beneficiary under testator's will 
against attorney-drafter alleging that attorney had negligently drafted a will contemporaneously 
with a trust had caused unnecessary increases in federal and estate taxes was subject to a motion 
to dismiss because the trust provided that any estate taxes incurred should be paid from the trust 
and not from the estate). 
In this case, the Executor is not a beneficiary under the will and therefore has suffered no 
damage from the alleged diminution of the estate to be distributed to Ms. Duncan's beneficiaries. 
Because he is unable to prove any damage of his own, the Executor's Motion for Judgment must 
be dismissed as a matter of law. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the Executor has no standing to prosecute a legal malpractice claim against the 
Defendants, the Motion for Judgment must be dismissed as a matter of law. Moreover, neither 




against the Defendants. Finally, even if the Executor was a proper party to prosecute such a 
lawsuit, he cannot prove damages as a result of any conduct of the Defendants as a matter of law. 
For these reasons, the Defendants ask that the Court sustain their Demurrer and that the 
action be dismissed at the cost of the plaintiff. 
John Y. Pearson, Jr. (VSB No. 12004) 
Frank A. Edgar, Jr. (VSB No. 36833) 
Wendy E. Giberti (VSB No. 44093) 
WILLCOX & SAVAGE, P.C. 
1800 Bank of America, N.A. 
Norfolk, VA 23510 
(757) 628-5500 
(757) 628-5566 Fax 
JONES, BLECHMAN, WOLTZ & KELLY, P.C., 
and JOHN TOMPKINS, III, ESQUIRE 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing was mailed to: 
Temple W. Cabell, Esquire 
SCHAFFER & CABELL, P.C. 
Chesterman Place 
I 00 West Franklin Street, Suite 200 
Richmond, VA 23218 




VIRGINIA: In the Circuit Court for the City of Newport News, 
CHARLES RUTTER, as Executor of 
the Estate of Mildred Duncan, 
v 
JONES, BLECHMAN, WOLTZ & 
KELLY, P.C., 
and 
JOHN TOMPKINS Ill , Esquire, 
Defendants. 
Law No. 27424-VA 
The Judges of the Seventh Judicial Circuit hereby recuse 
themselves from hearing the above captioned matter. Pursuant to Virginia 
Code Section 17.1-1 05-(B) of the Code of Virginia the Clerk is directed to 
certify a copy of this order to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of 
Virginia. 
~ 
Entered this jQ_ Day of January, 2000 
Judge ward r.. Hubbard 
a~r 
Judge Randolph T. West 
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·o··· ~ . . 
Thank you for speaking to me yesterday regarding the Newport News case styled Charles Rutter 
etc. v. Jones et al which you have agreed to hear on a future date in the Circuit Court of the City of 
Newport News. No hearing or trial date has been set in referenced caSe from which all of the Newport 
News judges have recused themselves. 
Judge Curran's office will alert all counsel in this case that you are the designated judge, and they 
will be contacting you directly to discuss a hearing schedule. If you need copies of the file, contact 
Judge Curran or Rex Davis. 
If I can be of further assistance in any way, please let me know. 
FAHJr:pbk 
Enclosures 
cc: Honorable Robert W. Curran, Judge 
Honorable Rex A. Davis, Clerk 
Sincerely, 
JAftLlhi-S( 
Frederick A. Hodnett, Jr. 
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1 
Senior Justice of the Supreme Court of Virginia, by virtue of authority vested in me by law, do hereby 
designate-
HONORABLE NORMAN OLITSKY, RETIRED JUDGE 
OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL CIRCUIT TO PRESIDE 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS 
In the case of 
Charles Rutter, as Executor of the Estate of Mildred Duncan 
v. 
Jones, Blechman, Woltz & Kelly, P.C., et al 
Law Number 27424 
To be heard on a date set by the Judge, and continuing 
until the matters presented to him in this case 
have been disposed of according to law . 
. In the place of 
THE JUDGES OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT 
who are so situated as to render it improper, in their opinion, 
for them to preside at the trial of the said case. 





100 WEST FRANKLIN STREET. SUITE 200 
RICHMOND. VIRGINIA 23220 
TELEPHONE· 18041 646·0064 
FACSIMILE, 18041 646·5808 
Mr. Rex A. Davis, Clerk 
Nevvport News Circuit Court 
2500 Washington A venue 
LAW OFFICES 
SCHAFFER & CABELL 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
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POST OFFICE BOX 507 
RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23218 
May 2, 2000 
Newport News, Virginia 23607-4307 
V IRGINIA BEACH 
INDEPENDENCE LAW CENTER 
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Re: Charles Rutter. as Executor ofthe Estate of Mildred Duncan v. Jones, Blechman, 
\Voltz & Kelly, P.C., and John Tompkins, III, Esquire 
Attention: Judge Norman 0/itsky 
Dear Mr. Davis: 
Please find enclosed the plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to the Defendant's 
Demurrer which I would appreciate you filing with tht: court. Please be advised that this case has 
been assigned to Retired Judge Norman Olitsky. Should you have any questions, please do not 
hesitate to contact me. 
Thank you for your assistance in this regard. 
cc: 
Wendy Giberti, Esq. 
Charles Rutter 
Very truly yours, 
D 












IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS 
CHARLES RUTTER, as Executor of the 
Estate of Mildred Duncan, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JONES, BLECHMAN, WOLTZ & KELLY, P.C. 
and 
JOHN TOMPKINS III, ESQUIRE 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S DEMURRER 
. .. 
-~ . , . 
COMES NOW the plaintiff, Charles Rutter as Executor of the Estate of Mildred Duncan, 
by counsel, providing the court with the following analysis of the facts and law at issue for the its 
review: 
I. Statement of Facts 
On or about December 14, 1993, Mildred Duncan contracted with the defendants to draft 
her last will and testament and corresponding revocable trust. Defendants agreed to perform said 
task for a consideration paid to them. Furtherance of the testator's intentions required, inter alia, 
that two charitable bequests amounting to 10% ofDuncan's estate be devised to Trinity 
Methodist Church in Newport News and the Washington and Lee School of Law. In addition, 
she requested that a small"remembrance" in the amount of$5,000 each be left to her two 
housekeepers. 
As drafted, said "pour over" will and revocable trust failed to effectuate the testator's 




of the gifts to the two housekeepers was left to the discretion of the trustee. As such, the 
testator's estate was not ascertainable at her death, disqualifying the estate from receiving the 
charitable tax deductions afforded per Tax Code Section 2055(a). 
After Ms. Duncan's death, the defendants continued to advise Mr. Rutter as executor of 
Ms. Duncan's estate; a contractual relationship existed. Although the effect of the defendants' 
flawed drafting of said will and trust could have been rectified if the two housekeepers 
disclaimed their interests, defendants failed to so advise Mr. Rutter. As a result, the two 
housekeepers were never asked to disclaim their gifts, cementing the damage of the defendants' 
misfeasance and malfeasance. 
On account of the defendants' mistakes, the estate of Ms. Duncan was caused to suffer 
special damages exceeding $700,000 dollars. Charles Rutter, as executor of Mildred Duncan's 
estate, brings this action on behalf of the estate to recover the damages which resulted from the 
defendants' breach of contract. Allegations sounding in both contract and tort have been averred. 
The defendants demur, claiming that the plaintiffs Motion for Judgment fails to state a cause of 
action upon which relief may be granted. The plaintiff contends that both its counts are well 
founded. 
II. Argument 
A. Charles Rutter, as Executor of the Estate ofMildred Duncan, is the proper 
party to bring this breach of contract action as it survives Ms. Duncan's 
death to her executor. 
The entire thrust of the defendants' argument is that the Executor is not entitled to bring 
this action because privity of contract is lacking between him and the negligent attorneys. In so 
arguing, the defendants obfuscate the function of an Executor. An Executor brings an action on 
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behalf of the decedent and not on behalf of himself. Certainly the defendants do not claim that 
Mildred Duncan was not in privity with the malfeasant attorneys. Hence, the pertinent inquiry is 
not whether the Executor can establish privity of contract but, rather, whether Ms. Duncan's 
breach of contra~t claim survived her death. Both Virginia Code Section 8.01-25 and the 
common law of this Commonwealth resoundingly answer in the affirmative. 
I. Virginia Code Section 8.01-25 Endorses this Claim's Survival. 
The Virginia General Assembly enacted Code Section 8.01-25 to further the common 
law rule on survival of actions. The script of said statute broadens the common law; it does not 
abrogate or narrow it. Section 8.01-25 provides in pertinent part: 
"Every cause of action whether legal or equitable, which is cognizable in the 
Commonwealth of Virginia, shall survive the death of the person ... whose favor the cause 
of action existed." 
As explained infra., the defendants breached their contract with Mildred Duncan upon the 
execution of testamentary instruments which failed to effectuate her intentions. At that point, she 
could have sued for damages amounting to the cost of she would have incurred in hiring a 
competent attorney to correct the defendants' mistakes. Lucidly, the cause of action existed prior 
to her death then. The effect of her death was to greatly exacerbate the defendants' mistake, 
increasing the damages caused. But there can be no question that the breach of contract occurred 
prior to Ms. Duncan's death. Hence, as a claim which is cognizable in the Commonwealth of 
Virginia, by operation of statute it survives to Ms. Duncan's executor. 
II. The common law of Virginia countenances this action's survival. 
The defendants obviously conducted an exhaustive canvass of the law of other 
jurisdictions; their brief is replete with persuasive but non-controlling citations. The defendants 
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seem particularly fond ofNew York law. While the defendants' appreciable diligence is indeed 
commendable, it is inapposite here; the learned justices of Virginia have already explicated the 
Commonwealth's position on the issue presented herein. Virginia judges have penned ample 
opinions which militate strongly in favor of the plaintiffs position. Therefore, this court need 
not further confound these apparently benighted defendants by injecting ambiguity into the well-
defined law of this Commonwealth. That is to say, it should not allow New York law to supplant 
that of Virginia. 
Virginia law originally mirrored that of England. While it has divorced itself from 
England to some extent throughout the years, the two bodies of law remain quite concentric. At 
common law, here and in England, the general rule is that actions in contract survive except 
where the damage is to the person.1 For example, a breach of a promise to marry does not 
survive under the common law because the broken promise mars the person and not the estate; 
the inherently personal nature of the promise precludes the estate from suffering any identifiable 
loss. Breach of an implied contract to perform medical services competently does not survive 
under common law because death renders the breach moot. Likewise, breach of an implied 
contract to provide effective assistance of counsel in a capital criminal case does not survive 
because the person's mortality truncates the dispute as to his or her right to physical liberty. 
However, where special damages to the estate can be concretely shown, an action for attorney 
malpractice survives to the decedent's executor.2 
1 Winston v. Gordon, 115 Va. 889, 80 S.E. 756 (1914); BankofGrottoes, 8 F.2d 321 
(1925); Westover Court Corp. v. Eley, 185 Va. 718,40 S.E.2d 177 (1946); Patton v. Brady, 184 
u.s. 713 (1902). 
2 Grubb v. Suit, 73 Va. (32 Gratt.) 203, (1879). 
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Here, the defendants' breach of contract did not damage Mildred Duncan personally. 
Indeed, the defendants concede as much in their brief.l Rather, Ms. Duncan's estate absorbed 
the effect of the defendants' breach, realizing special damages equal to the diminished value of 
the estate imposed by additional tax burdens. This is precisely the type of breach which the 
courts have found to survive a decedent's death. Grubb v. Suit, 73 Va. (32 Gratt.) 203 
(1879)(holding that an action for breach of contract survives where the damages, special in 
nature, affect the estate and not the person). 
In Grubb, the court considered, inter alia, whether the defendant's breach of a promise to 
marry survived the non-breaching party's death. The court methodically examined and explained 
the role and function of an executor. The court first recognized executors as the "representatives 
of the temporal property --that is, the debts and goods- of the deceased". Id. at 205. The court 
then went on to distinguish which causes of actions survive for or against the executor. Said the 
court: 
"The distinction seems to be between causes of action which affect the estate, and those 
which affect the person only,· the former survives for or against the executor and the 
latter dies with the person. According to these distinctions an action for the breach of 
promise of marriage would not survive, for it is a contract merely personal; at least it does 
not necessarily affect property. The principal ground of damages is disappointed hope; 
the injury complained of is violated faith, more resembling, in substance, deceit and fraud 
than mere common breach of promise. The damages may be, and frequently are, 
vindictive and if they could be proved against the executor, might render the estate 
insolvent, to the loss and injury of creditors. For these and other reasons, it is settled in 
England that such an action does not survive for an executor ... Executors represent 
property only. They can take only such rights of action as affect property and cannot 
recover for injuries for personal wrongs. Although, in form, (an action for breach of 
contract to marry] resembles an action on contract, in substance it falls within the 
definition of the exception as an action in the case for personal injuries". 
3 In the defendants' brief in support of their demurrer, the defendants argue in Section III 
that Ms. Duncan was not damaged as a matter of law. 
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Id. at 210, 212. (emphasis added) 
Clearly, this action affects only the property ofMildren Duncan and not her person; the 
defendants' breach singularly affects the value of her estate. The Executor brings this action to 
recover the assets which were forfeited on account of the defendants' failure to deftly draft the 
testamentary instruments in question. In toto, the damages sued for are special in nature; the 
plaintiff's ad damnum does not include a prayer for pain and suffering or any other similarly 
unquantifiable general injury. The Executor merely seeks, for the benefit of the estate, the 
property (money in this case) surrendered due to said instruments' failure to reap a charitable 
deduction. The case law unequivocally counsels that this type of action survives Ms. Duncan. 
The Executor's privity of contract then, or lack thereof, is beyond the relevant sphere of inquiry. 
Indeed, Virginia courts have held that myriad analogous actions survive the death of the 
aggrieved party. An action against a bank to recover for the loss of the contents of a safety 
deposit box survives to the personal representative.4 An action for the breach of a covenant 
survives to the personal representative. s An action for damages to land survives to the personal 
representative.6 An action in detinue survives to the personal representative.7 An action for the 
violation of antitrust laws survives to the personal representative.8 An action for the invasion of 
4 Bank ofGrottes v. Brown, 8 F.2d 321 (4th Cir. 1925). 
s Lee v. Hill, 87 Va. 919, 12 S.E. 1052 (1891). 
6 Appomattox Co. v. Hardings, 52 Va. (11 Gratt) 1 (1854). 
7 Catlett v. Russell, 33 Va. (6 Leigh) 344 (1835). 
8 Barnes Coal Corp. v. Retail Coal Merchants Ass 'n, 128 F.2d 645 (4th Cir.), rev'g 43 F. 
Supp. 309 (E.D. Va. 1942). 
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a patent survives to the personal representative.9 Factually, this suit resembles the aforecited 
cases in that it also involves the survival of an action affecting a corporeal estate interest. As 
such, the defendants cannot assert any intelligible rationale counseling this court to find that an 
action for attorney malpractice in inexpertly drafting a testamentary instrument should not 
survive to an Executor. 
Under the common law, actions for intentional torts such as assault, battery, intentional 
infliction of emotional stress, defamation, etc. did not survive to the executor because they are 
inherently personal in nature. These actions affect the plaintiffs well-being and not the value of 
his or her material accumulations. Therefore, the common law extinguished them upon the 
plaintiffs death. But claims which involve the aggregate value of their holder's tangible 
pecuniary worth have been found to survive his or her departure. Of course, this makes sense. 
For all intensive purposes, a physical or emotional wound evaporates at death; that is to say, the 
derivative result of such a personal affront does not survive the aggrieved's parting. But the 
effect of an injury which slights a person's net worth is felt even after that person's passing as it 
derogates the decedent's ability to provide for loved ones left behind. Hence, the law deems 
these actions to survive to the decedent's Executor or functionally equivalent personal 
representative. Accordingly, Mildred Duncan's Executor properly brings this action on her 
behalf to recover the special damages the defendants' breach caused her estate to suffer. 
In Patton v. Brady10, the United States Supreme Court, applying Virginia law, held that an 
action to recover a wrongly levied tax survived against the executor of the tax collector. The 
9 Pathe Exch. v. Dalke, 49 F.2d 161 (4th Cir. 1961). 
10 184 U.S. 609,46 L.Ed. 713 (1902). 
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plaintiff alleged that the deceased tax collector imposed duties which were not required by law. 
The collector's executrix argued that such a claim did not survive the collector's death. Finding 
the action one founded on a contract (ex contractu), the court held that the right of action 
survived against the defendant's executor. Patton v. Brady, 46 L.Ed. at 717. 
Like Patton, this case involves the recovery of property. The Executor brings this action 
on behalf of Mildred Duncan seeking recovery of the damages the defendants' breach of contract 
caused her estate to suffer. Because this action is one ex contractu involving lost property only, 
it survives her death under the common law. Charles Rutter then, as Executor of her estate, is the 
proper party to bring this action. As such, the plaintiff requests that this court overrule the 
defendants' demurrer. 
B. The defendants breached their contract with Mildred Duncan prior to her 
death. 
The defendants claim that because Ms. Duncan's estate did not incur additional tax 
burdens until her death, she did not suffer any damages as a matter of law. Were this action 
grounded solely in tort, the defendants' claim might merit consideration. But because Ms. 
Duncan's claim arises out of contract, the defendants' arguments fail to comport with governing 
legal principles. 
Mildred Duncan contracted with the defendants to draft her last will and testament and 
corresponding revocable trust. She requested, inter alia, that said instruments provide for 
charitable contributions to Trinity Methodist Church in Newport News and the Washington and 
Lee School of Law. Implicit in this instruction was that her estate qualify for charitable tax 
deductions with respect to said charitable contributions. In exchange for defendants' services, 
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she paid them an attorney's fee. Defendants breached their contract in that said instruments, as 
drafted, were ineffectual to carry out Ms. Duncan's intentions. Had Ms. Duncan realized the 
nature of this mistake during her lifetime, she could have immediately sued the defendants for 
breach of contract. However, her damages would have been limited to the attorney's fee she paid 
defendants to draft said instruments or the amount which she would have incurred in hiring 
competent attorneys to redress the defendants' mistakes. That is to say, she would have been 
restricted to recovering general damages fixed at the amount the court found necessary to put her 
in the position she would have been in had the defendants not breached their contract; 
consequential damages would not have been available. But through no fault of Ms. Duncan's, 
the defendants' mistake was not unearthed during her lifetime. As a result, the defendants' 
breach resulted in consequential damages as well as general damages. 
The law does not foreclose her Executor from recovering consequential damages in 
prosecuting Ms. Duncan's right of action. Nor can the defendants raise failure to mitigate as a 
defense. Due to the esoteric nature of the performance sought, Ms. Duncan could not have been 
expected to discover the defendants' broken promises on her own. And since only the 
defendants advised Ms. Duncan regarding the status of her affairs, another attorney was not 
available to detect the defendants' misfeasance. Recognition of this problem supplies the 
foundation underneath Virginia's election to adopt the continuing treatment rule. 
In an action on contract, a successful plaintiff is entitled to recover those damages which 
are "the natural and direct result of the breach". 11 Included in this definition are what courts 
commonly term consequential damages. Consequential damages are those damages caused by 
11 APCA v. Walker, Inc., 214 Va. 524,201 S.E.2d 758,767 (1974). 
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special circumstances, compensable only where the contracting parties contemplated the special 
circumstances when they struck their legally enforceable agreement. 12 
Here, the special circumstance at issue is Ms. Duncan's death. Her death, which 
cemented the onerous imposition of additional taxes on her estate, gives rise to the consequential 
damages sought in this action. There can be no question that this special circumstance was 
contemplated by the parties at the time of contracting. The contract involved the preparation of a 
last will and testament and corresponding revocable trust. Certainly then, the death of Ms. 
Duncan was contemplated by the parties at the time of contracting. 
In sum, the Executor may recover a multitude of damages in this case. First, the Executor 
may recover the attorney's fee paid the defendants to draft the ineffectual instruments. Secondly, 
the Executor may recover consequential damages resulting from additional tax burdens fixed at 
Ms. Duncan's death. Finally, the Executor may recover any other damages sustained such as the 
fees charged by the defendants in unsuccessfully attempting to rectify their own mistakes, 
additional accounting fees incurred and other incidental damages which the trier of fact 
determines to have been suffered by the estate. 
C. Public policy requires that the defendants' arguments be rejected. 
The defendants urge this court to endorse a position which is antipodal to common sense 
and defies equity. The defendants pose that Virginia law precludes the Executor from recovering 
in his representative capacity because privity of contract is lacking. The defendants also imply, 
and probably rightly so, that the holding espoused by the Virginia Supreme Court in Copenhaver 




v. Rogers prohibits a plaintiff from asserting a third-party beneficiary malpractice claim against a 
negligent attorney in most circumstances. While it is hard to glean any cognizable rule of law 
from Copenhaver's amorphous holding, it unquestionably speaks vociferously against the 
assertion of third-party beneficiary malpractice claims against Virginia attorneys. Hence, the 
defendants urge this court to adopt a position which, for all practical purposes, deploys an 
umbrella of absolute immunity under which Virginia estate attorneys may wreck the lives of their 
clients without fear of possible recourse. Surely, the public policy of this Commonwealth does 
not buttress such an astringent and absurd ruling. 
In plain terms, it makes perfect sense that an Executor should bring this type of action. 
The Virginia Supreme Court wisely established a firm line of demarcation in limiting a 
beneficiary's ability to sue attorneys for unskillful drafting of estate instruments. Otherwise, 
courts would be forced to house and sort the disputes of an infinite line of disgruntled individuals 
every time a will reached probate. But this rule should not vitiate the Executor's long held right 
to sue on behalf of the decedent. Indeed, it is the Executor who is best able to marshal the claims 
all interested parties, bringing them before the court for resolution in one case. Where the estate 
suffers as the result of attorney malpractice as it has here, judicial efficiency is promoted by 
allowing and requiring that the Executor recover the damages suffered by the estate and then 
allocate those assets to the respective parties. Such a task is within the ambit of his or duties. In 
any event, there is undoubtedly no need to alter Virginia's legal system via judicial fiat by 
adopting and applying New York law (as urged by defendants) when existing and controlling 
Virginia law is clearly supple enough to envelope this action and deliver an equitable resolution. 
All in all then, the defendants' demurrer should be overruled. 
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WHEREFORE, the plaintiff, by counsel, respectfully requests that this court overrule the 
defendants' demurrer. 
Temple W. Cabell, Esquire 
D. Hayden Fisher, Esquire 
SCHAFFER & CABELL, P.C. 
P.O. Box 507 
Riclunond, Virginia 23218-0507 
(804) 648-0064 
Counsel for Plaintiff 
CHARLES RUTTER, as Executor 
of the Estate of Mildred Duncan 
I hereby certify that a tru~ an~ correct copy of the foregoing has been faxed to counsel of 
record as set forth below on this~ day of May, 2000 and will be hand-d · d to c el of 
record at the hearing. 
Wendy E. Giberti, Esquire 
WILCOX & SAVAGE, P.C. 
1800 Bank of America, N.A. 




WILLCOX & SAVAGE, P.C. 
FRANK A. EDGAR, JR. 
(757) 628-5647 
fedgarjr@wi lsav.com 
IU:PLY TO NORFOLK OFFICE 
44095.003 
The Honorable E. L. Hubbard 
Newport News Circuit Court 
Courthouse Building 
2500 Washington A venue 
Newport News, VA 23607-4307 
ATTN: LIBBY GREEN 
ATIORNEYS AT LAW 
1800 BANK OF AMERICA CENTER 
ONE COMMERCIAL PLACE 
NORFOLK, VIRG INIA 23510-2197 
(757) 628-5500 
FACSIMILE: (757) 628-5566 
www.willcoxandsavage.com 
June 6, 2000 
Re: Charles Rutter, as Executor of tlte Estate of Mildred 
Duncan v. Jones, Blechman, Woltz & Kelly, P.C. 
and John Tompkins, Ill, Esquire 
At Law No. CL99-27424-VA 
Dear Ms. Green: 
o 7 JUN ?aaa 
ONE COLUMBUS CENTER, SUITE 1010 
VIRGINIA BEACH. VIRGINIA 23462-6764 
Enclosed please find a Notice of Hearing for filing in the above-referenced matter. As we 
discussed, please reserve a conference room for this hearing on August 28, 2000 at 10:00 a.m. I 
expect the hearing will take approximately one hour. If you have any questions, please call me. 
Thanking you for your assistance in this matter, I am 
FAEjr/nlb 
Enclosure 
cc: The Honorable Norman Olitsky 
Svein J. Lassen, Esq. 
1-317739.1 
616100 
John T. Tompkins, III, Esq. 
Temple W. Cabell, Esq. 
Very truly yours, 
7//{H 
Frank A. Edgar, Jr. 
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VIRGINIA: IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS 
CHARLES RUTTER, as Executor of 
the Estate of Mildred Duncan, 
Plaintiff, 
V. ATLAWNO. CL99-27424-VA 
JONES, BLECHMAN, WOLTZ & KELLY, P.C. , 
and JOHN TOMPKINS, III, ESQUIRE, 
Defendants. 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that a hearing is scheduled for Monday, August 28, 2000, at 
10:00 a.m. , before Retired Judge Norman Olitsky, wherein the defendant, Jones, Blechman, 
Woltz & Kelly, P.C., will bring on for hearing its Demurrer filed previously herein. 
PLEASE GOVERN YOURSEL YES ACCORDINGLY. 
John Y. Pearson, Jr. 
Frank A. Edgar, Jr. 
Wendy E. Giberti 
Willcox & Savage, P.C. 
1800 Bank of America Center 
One Commercial Place 
Norfolk, VA 23510-2197 
(757) 628-5500 
(757) 628-5566 (fax) 
1-317736. I 
6/6/00 
JONES, BLECHMAN, WOLTZ & KELLY, P.C., 
and JOHN TOMPKINS, III , ESQUIRE 
( I-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing Notice of Hearing was mailed to: 
this 610 day of June, 2000. 
1-31n36. 1 
616100 
Temple W. Cabell, Esquire 
SCHAFFER & CABELL, P.C. 
Chesterman Place 
100 West Franklin Street, Suite 200 
Richmond, VA 23218 
I . ' 
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WILLCOX & SAVAGE, P.C. 
FRANK A. EDGAR, JR. 
(757) 628-5647 
fedgarjr@wilsav.com 
REPLY TO NORFOLK OFFICE 
44095.003 
Rex A. Davis, Clerk 
Newport News Circuit Court 
Courthouse Building 
2500 Washington A venue 
Newport News, VA 23607-4307 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
1800 BANK OF AMERICA CENTER 
ONE COMMERCIAL PLACE 
NORFOLK. VIRG INIA 23510-2197 
(757) 628-5500 
FACSIMILE: (757) 628-5566 
www.willcoxandsavage.com 
July I 0, 2000 
Re: Charles Rutter, as Executor of the Estate of Mildred 
Duncan v. Jones, Blechman, Woltz & Kelly, P.C. 
and John Tompkins, III, Esquire 
At Law No. CL99-27424-VA 
Dear Mr. Davis: 
ONE COLUMBUS CENTER. SUITE 1010 
VIRGINIA BEACH. VIRGINIA 23462-6764 
I enclose for filing in the above-referenced matter defendant Jones, Blechman, Woltz & 
Kelly 's Motion for Protective Order. If you have any question, please call me. 
Thanking you for your assistance in this matter, I am 
FAEjr/smf 
Enclosure 
cc: D. Hayden Fisher, Esq. 
1-323 145. 1 
7110/00 
Svein J. Lassen, Esq. 
Very truly yours, 
Z{(z;:J 















~:c 0 m-u a ··~·n ><~ c_ 
):>.- c 
. - r- ,-..:-::-.::::. 
o!3 
. -:.:.:::-~  ~~ t; 
- 0 
~:c ~ r.·~4.;.~ (}g :3: ~ Col ;i 
r- - C3 ~ il IT!-
r;=-9 ::on a ~~ N -~ 
.;: 
... 
VIRGINIA: IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS 
CHARLES RUITER, as Executor of 
the Estate ofMildred Duncan, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
JONES, BLECHMAN, WOLTZ & KELLY, P.C., 
and JOHN TOMPKINS, III, ESQUIRE, 
Defendants. 
AT LAW NO. CL99-27424-VA 
MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER 
NOW COMES defendant JONES, BLECHMAN, WOLTZ & KELLY, P.C. ("Jones 
Blechman"), by counsel, pursuant to Rules of the Virginia Supreme Court, and moves this Court 
for an Order staying the time by which Jones Blechman must respond to the Amended First Set 
oflnterrogatories and First Request for Production of Documents served by plaintiff CHARLES 
RUTTER, as Executor of the Estate of Mildred Duncan ("Rutter"), until the parties are at issue in 
the matter. In support of its Motion, Jones Blechman states as follows: 
1. On August 20, 1999, Rutter served on Jones Blechman and one of the lawyers in 
that firm, defendant John Tompkins, a Motion for Judgment in which Rutter asserted claims for 
breach of contract and negligence founded on the defendants' alleged malpractice. 
2. In response, the defendants filed a joint Demurrer to all counts in the Motion for 





3. The hearing on the defendants' Demurrer originally was set for December 16, 
1999. However, shortly before that date, the Judges ofthe Circuit Court of the City ofNewport 
News recused themselves from hearing the case. The hearing then was postponed while the 
matter was sent to the Virginia Supreme Court for the designation of a judge. After the 
Honorable Norman Olitsky was designated in March 2000 to hear the case, the hearing on the 
defendants' DemuiTer was rescheduled for June 2, 2000. 
4. Unfortunately, due to a miscommunication, the hearing scheduled for June 2, 
2000, had to be rescheduled. By agreement of counsel, and with the approval of Judge Olitsky, 
the hearing on the defendants' Demurrer now is scheduled for August 28, 2000, at 10:00 a.m. 
5. Even though the defendants' Demurrer to all of the claims in the Motion for 
Judgment remains pending, the plaintiff nevertheless served on defendant Jones Blechman his 
Amended First Set oflnterrogatories and First Request for Production of Documents by mail on 
June 15, 2000. In response, defendant Jones Blechman timely filed objections to the discovery 
on July 10, 2000. 
6. Jones Blechman respectfully requests that this Court enter an Order staying Jones 
Blechman's answers and responses to plaintiffs Amended First Set oflnterrogatories and First 
Request for Production of Documents until after defendants' Demurrer has been argued and ruled 
upon by this Court. Because the Demurrer remains pending, the parties still are not at issue in 
this case. If the Demurrer is sustained on all counts, then the case would be dismissed and the 
discovery served by the plaintiff would become moot. Requiring Jones Blechman to answer 
interrogatories and identify and produce documents at this stage of the case while its Demurrer 
remains pending may cause Jones Blechman considerable undue burden and expense. Moreover, 
1-323 136.1 
7/ 10/00 2 
44 
because no trial date has been set in this case, allowing Jones Blechman to respond to plaintiffs 
discovery only after its Demurrer has been heard and ruled upon by the Court will not prejudice 
plaintiff in the preparation of his case. 
WHEREFORE, for the reasons stated above, defendant Jones, Blechman, Woltz & Kelly, 
P.C., by counsel, prays that this Court enter an Order staying the time by which it must respond 
to Rutter's Amended First Set oflnterrogatories and First Request for Production of Documents 
until after this Court has heard and ruled upon the defendants' Demurrer. 
John Y. Pearson, Jr. (VSB No. 12004) 
Frank A. Edgar, Jr. (VSB No. 36833) 
Wendy E. Giberti (VSB No. 44093) 
WILLCOX & SAVAGE, P.C. 
1800 Bank of America Center 
One Commercial Place 
Norfolk, VA 235 10-2 197 
(757) 628-5500 
(757) 628-5566 Fax 
1-323136. 1 
7/10/00 
JONES, BLECHMAN, WOLTZ & KELLY, P.C., 
3 
J I /\. 
45 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the j{)_ ~ay of July, 2000, a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing was served via First Class U.S. mail, postage prepaid, on the following : 
1-323 136. I 
7/ 10/00 
Temple W. Cabell, Esq. 
D. Hayden Fisher, Esq. 
SCHAFFER & CABELL, P.C. 
P.O. Box 507 
Richmond, VA 23218-0507 




VIRGINIA: IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NEWPORT NE\VS 
CHARLES RUTTER, as Executor of 
the Estate ofMildred Duncan, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
















AT LAW NO. CL99-27 424-VA 
This cause came to be heard upon the Demurrer filed by defendants Jones, Blechman, 
Woltz & Kelly, P.C. and John Tompkins, III, Esquire. 
Upon consideration whereof, having heard the arguments of all parties, and for good 
cause shown, the Court adopts the argument as presented by the defendants and hereby 
ORDERS that th:: D~murrcr filed by the dcfendan!s tn plu.intiffs Motion for Judgment is 
SUSTAINED; and further 
ORDERS that plaintiff is granted leave to reinstitute another motion within twenty-one 
(21) days from entry of this Order. 
1-343125.1 
12/18/00 
\ .---] o \ 
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ENTERED this ----"-3 __ day of~' 20qll. 
SEEN: 
Frank A. Edgar, Jr.~/ 
WILLCOX & SAVAGE, P.C. 
1800 Bank of America Center 
One Commercial Place 
Norfolk, VA 23510-2197 
(757) 628-5500 
Counsel for Defendants 
e W. Cabell, Esq. 
AFFER & CABELL, P.C. 
Chesterman Place 
100 West Franklin Street, Suite 200 
Richmond, VA 23218 
(804) 648-0064 








100 WEST FRANKLIN STREET, SUITE 200 
RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23220 
TELEPHONE : 1804 1 6480064 
FACSIMILE: 18041 648·S808 
Mr. Rex A. Davis, Clerk 
Newport News Circuit Court 
2500 Washington Avenue 
LAW OFFICES 
SCHAFFER & CABELL 
t1AILING ADDRESS 
POST OFFICE BOX 507 
RlCH~IOND, VIRGINL\. 23218 
January 17, 2001 
\ffi 
Newport News, Virginia 23607-4307 
VIRGI NIA BEACH 
INDEPENDENCE LAW CENTER 
43S6 BONNEY ROAD, SUITE 2·102 
VIRGINIA BEACH. V IRGINIA 234S2 
TELEPHONE : 17 571 631·9100 
Re: Charles Rutter, as Executor of the Estate of Mildred Duncan v. Jones, Blechman, 
Woltz & Kelly, P.C., and John Tompkins, ill, Esquire 
Case No.: CL 99-27424 
Dear Mr. Davis: 
Please fmd enclosed the plaintiffs Amended Motion for Judgment to be filed with the 
Court in the above styled case. 
Thank you for your assistance in this regard. 
DHF/kh 
Enclosure 
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VIRGIN I A: 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS 
CHARLES RUTTER, as executor of 
the estate of Mildred Duncan Plaintiff, 
V . Case No. : CL99 27424 
JONES, BLECHMAN, WOLTZ & KELLY, P.C. 
and 
JOHN TOMPKINS, Ill, ESQUIRE Defendants. 
AMENDED MOTION FOR JUDGMENT 
I. The plaintiff, Charles M. Rutter, III as executor of the estate of Mildred Duncan, 
at all times mentioned herein was a resident of Newport News, Virginia. 
2. The defendant, John T. Tompkins, III, Esquire, at all times mentioned herein was 
an attorney duly licensed under the laws of the State of Virginia to practice the 
profession of law. 
3. The defendant, Jones, Blechman, Woltz & Kelly, P.C., at all times mentioned 
herein, contracted to provide legal services to Mildren Duncan and her estate. 
4. Both defendants continued to provide legal services to the decedent, Mildred 
Duncan, and to her estate following her death, for a consideration paid to them 
· until March of 1998. 
5. At all times relevant, the defendants failed to exercise or use the reasonable 
degree of care, skill and diligence that a reasonable and ordinary_~ttorney _would 
-
exercise in handling a matter, or matters, entrusted to him by a c~e~~- E~ ~:~ 
' :-· ... . .. . 
: :: -::-. 
6. At all times relevant, the defendants failed to perform their dutie~ to M~.:pu~, 
. • C :J 
! ~ : . ~: ·. 
and following her death, her estate, as represented by the plaintiff tllro4gh his:;: 
... } -
: : _:_ .:: t.O 
capacity as executor, in the manner in which a reasonable and ordin~aijor®y, 





-; . ~· 
using a reasonable degree of care, skill and diligence, would perform them. 
Count! 
7. Heretofore and on or about December 14, 1993, defendants undertook for a 
consideration paid them to prepare and draft the last will and testament and 
revocable trust of Mildred Duncan, now deceased, and did accordingly prepare 
such instruments so entitled which Mildred Duncan subscribed, and which were 
signed by the requisite persons and number of witnesses. 
8. In consideration for her monies paid, Mildred Duncan specifically requested that 
the defendants prepare testamentary instrument or instruments which effected, 
inter alia, her following intentions: 
a. That 10% of the residue of her estate be devised to Trinity United 
Methodist Church and Washington and Lee University as charitable 
bequests; 
b. That a remembrance amounting to about $5,000 respectively be devised to 
Elvira Crawley and Clarence Ackers, her two housekeepers, provided that 
they were still in her employ at her death. 
9. · In contracting with the def~ndants to effect said charitable contributions, Ms. 
Duncan intended to benefit her estate to the extent of applicable tax deductions. 
10. Pursuant to said contract, defendants owed a duty to Mildred Duncan to advise her 
of all tax consequences of her decisions. Defendants also owed Mildred Duncan, 
and her estate following her death, a duty to review all testamentary instruments 
and advise Mildred Duncan, and her estate following her death, of all tax 
consequences of the dispositions contained therein. 
51 
11. In an effort to effect Ms. Duncan's intentions, the defendants prepared a "pour-
over" last will and testament and corresponding revocable trust. Articles IV(B), 
IV (C)( 1) and IV ( C)(2) of said revocable trust read as follows in pertinent part: 
IV(B): "The trustee shall' distribute a cash sum to Elvira Crawley and 
Clarence Ackers, if they survive the Grantor and are in the employ of the 
Grantor at the Grantor's death. The Grantor intends that this bequest be a 
remembrance and may leave a suggested amount, but the ammmt of such 
bequest be entirely in the discretion of the Trustee." 
IV(C): "The remainder of the Trust Estate as then constituted shall be 
administered and distributed as follows: 
1. Ten percent (10%) to the Washington & Lee University to set up 
a scholarship for deserving law students in memory of the 
Grantor's husband, Thomas Duncan. 
2. Ten percent (1 0%) to the Trinity United Methodist Church 
United Methodist Church, 228-29" Street, Newport News, 
Virginia." 
12. The above quoted language of the revocable t.'llst of Mildred Duncan, prepared by 
defendants and executed on December 14, 1993 along with her last will and 
testament, was wholly ineffectual to carry out said intentions of Mildred Duncan 
in that, as drafted, the amount of the bequests to Trinity United Methodist Church 
and Washington and Lee University were unascertainabie at the time of her death; 
because the amounts of the devises to Elivra Crawlev and Clarence Ackers were 
left solely to the discretion of the trustee pursuant to the provisions of Article 
52 
IV(B) the numerical monetary value of the 10% bequests to Trinity United 
Methodist Church and Washington and Lee University could not be determined at 
the decedent's death. As a result, the bequests to Washington & Lee and Trinity 
United Methodist Church did not comport with the requirements set forth in 
Section 2055(a) of the federal tax code which relate to charitable tax deductions. 
13. Entirely because of the defendants' negligence and lack of skill in drafting said 
instrument, Articles IV(B), IV(C)(l) and IV(C)(2) of Mildred Duncan's 
aforementioned revocable trust were entirely ineffective to carry out the testator's 
intention that the bequests to Washington & Lee and Trinity United Methodist 
Church be charitable in nature and thus pass from her estate unencumbered by tax 
liability. 
14. The failure of Articles IV(B), TV(C)(l) and IV(C)(2) ofMildren Duncan's said 
revocable trust to carry out the wishes of the testator constituted a breach of 
contract as between Mildred Duncan, who is now deceased, and the defendants. 
Said breach occurred immediately upon the negligent drafting of said ineffectual 
testamentary instruments. Accordingly, Ms. Duncan, by and through her 
executor, is entitled to recover the monies she paid the defendants to draft said 
testamentary instruments. 
15. As a result of this breach of contract by defendants and their failure to rectify the 
breach during the lifetime of Ms. Duncan, the consequential damages of said 
breach escalated dramatically upon her death; her estate incurred tax liabilities on 
the bequests to Trinity United Methodist Church and Washington and Lee 
University which amounted to $663,996.00. These significant damages, which 
53 
greatly amplified the consequence of the defendant's breach of contract, were a 
natural and direct result of the defendant's breach of contract. 
16. Mildred Duncan's death was a special circumstance contemplated by the parties at 
the time of contracting when Ms. Duncan retained, for consideration, the 
defendants' services to draft her last will and testament and corollary trust. 
1 7. As a result of this breach of contract and the defendants' failed attempts to 
ameliorate its breach after Ms. Duncan's death, the estate incurred additional and 
substantial legal and accounting fees that it would not have incurred had the 
defendants cured their breach during Ms. Duncan's lifetime. 
18. Plaintiff, as executor of the estate of Mildred Duncan, is the proper party to bring 
this action to recover, solely for the benefit of Ms. Duncan's estate, the sum of the 
amount of damages which resulted from the defendant's breach of contract. 
Count II 
19. All previous allegations are re-alleged herein as if fully pled. 
20. Following the death ofMildred Duncan, the defendants continued to advise her 
estate regarding the implications of said pour-over" will and corresponding 
revocable tn:st. 
21 . Subsumed within this representation was the duty to apprise Ms. Duncan's estate 
as to any potential consequences arising from operation of said "pour-over" will 
and corresponding revocable trust. 
22. The defendants breached said duty in failing to realize that the bequests to Elvira 
Crawley and Clarence Ackers, as drafted, disqualified the estate from receiving 
charitable deductions as to the bequests to Washington and Lee University and 
54 
Trinity United Methodist Church; they failed to counsel the estate that the drafting 
error and breach of contract could be rectified if Elvira Crawley and Clarence 
Ackers disclaimed their bequests. 
23. As a proximate result of defendants' failure to so counsel the estate, disclaimers 
were not filed and the estate was disqualified from receiving charitable deductions 
with respect to the bequests to Washington and Lee University and Trinity United 
Methodist Chmch. 
24. On account of defendants' negligence, the estate suffered substantial economic 
harm resulting from additional taxes, legal fees and accounting fees. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays that the court grant it judgment against the defendants in 
the sum of ONE :MILLION DOLLARS ($1 ,000,000), prejudgment interest from the date of the 
termination of defendants' services, and costs for damages resulting as aforesaid. 
A Trial by Jury is Demanded. 
Temple W. Cabe 
D. Hayden Fisher, 
SCHAFFER&C 
P.O. Box 507 




Charles M. Rutter 
By Counsel 
CHARLES RUTTER, as Executor 
of the Estate of Mildred Duncan 
By Counsel 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been mailed, postage pre-
""V" 
paid, to counsel of record as set forth below on this 1-; day of January, 2001. 
Frank A. Edgar, Jr., Esquire 
Wendy E. Giberti, Esquire 
WILCOX & SAVAGE, P.C. 
1800 Bank of America, N.A. 




WILLCOX & SAVAGE, P.C. 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
1800 BANK OF AM ERICA CENTER 
ONE COMMERCIAL PLACE 
NORFOLK, VIRGINIA 23510-2197 




FACSIMILE: (757) 628-5566 
www. willcoxandsavage.com 
ONE COLUMBUS CENTER, SUITE 1010 
VIRGINIA BEACH. VIRGINIA 23462·6764 
REPLY TO NORFOLK OfFICE 
Rex A. Davis, Clerk 
Newport News Circuit Court 
2500 Washington Ave. 
Newport News, VA 23607-4307 
Febmary 8, 2001 
Re: Charles Rutter v. Jones, Blechman, Woltz & Kelly, P.C., et al. 
At Law No.: CL99-27424-VA 




·:: .. _· . .. 
Enclosed please find a Demurrer which I would appreciate your filing in the above-
referenced matter. 
Thank you for your assistance in this matter. 
FAEjr/dc 
Enclosure 
cc: Temple W. Cabell, Esquire (w/encl.) 
Svein J. Lassen, Esquire (w/encl.) 







VIRGINIA: IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS 
CHARLES RUTTER, as Executor of 
the Estate of Mildred Duncan, 
Plaintiff, 
V. AT LAW NO. CL99-27 424-VA 
JONES, BLECHMAN, WOLTZ & KELLY, P.C., 
and JOHN TOMPKINS, III, ESQUIRE, 
Defendants. 
DEMURRER 
·. ·.·; .. -
l 
c..:J 
NOW COME the defendants, by counsel, and state that the Amended Motion for Judgillent 
c:~ 
herein filed against them is insufficient at law and should be dismissed, and as the grO~J?dS fo'i-the 
Demurrer state as follows: 
1. The plaintiff has no standing to bring this action. 
2. The plaintiff is not the proper party to bring this action. 
3. The plaintiff has not been damaged as a matter oflaw. 
4. The plaintiffhas failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 
5. The plaintiff has failed to plead any additional facts in its Amended Motion for 
Judgment that would be necessary for the court to reverse its Order earlier this year sustaining the 
defendants' Demurrer to the plaintiffs original Motion for Judgment. 
WHEREFORE, the defendants pray that their Demurrer be granted and this action be 




John Y. Pearson, Jr. 
Frank A. Edgar, Jr. 
WILLCOX & SAVAGE, P.C. 
1800 NationsBank Center 













CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing Demurrer was mailed to: 
Temple W. Cabell, Esq. 
D. Hayden Fisher, Esq. 
SCHAFFER & CABELL, P.C. 
Chesterman Place 
100 West Franklin Street, Suite 200 






IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS 
CHARLES RUTTER, as Executor of the 
Estate of Mildred Duncan 
v. 
JONES, BLECHMAN, WOLTZ & KELLY, P.C. 
and 
JOHN TOMPKINS III, ESQUIRE 
Plaintiff, 
Case No. 27424-VA 
Defendants. 
FINAL ORDER 
CAME THE PARTIES, by counsel, on the defendant's Demurrer to the plaintiff's 
Amended Motion for Judgment, and good cause being shown, it is hereby 
ORDERED that the defendant' s Demurrer to the plaintiffs Amended Motion for 
Judgment shall be granted and that judgment shall be entered for the defendants. The clerk is 
directed to forward a certified copy of this Order to all counsel of record. 
ENTERED:¥)/ /2001 
I Ask For This: 
F~ 
WILCOX & SAVAGE, P .C. 
1800 Bank of America, N .A. 
Norfolk, Virginia 23510 
Counsel for Defendants 
JUDO~~~ 
,VC? SegdObje~ C'>~ 
Tepie W. Cabell, Esquire 
D. Hayden Fisher, Esquire 
SCHAFFER & CABELL, P.C. 
P.O. Box 507 
Richmond, Virginia 23218-0507 
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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NEWPORT N~·~'~ .. - :·~;.· ; ·_, '-(:) 
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• .• · ,..--:1 
CHARLES RUTTER, as Executor of the 
Estate of Mildred Duncan, 
Plaintiff, 
. ; · .. ··~ 
. · ··:'. -~ 
v. Case No.: 27424-VA 
JONES, BLECHMAN, WOLTZ & KELLY, P.C. 
and 
JOHN TOMPKINS III, ESQUIRE 
Defendants. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
._ .. ;. ...~ 
..... ,, ~ 
·. ) ·~ · . 
. . . ·~ ~ :. ·. 
-, 
,, 
COMES NOW the plaintiff, Charles Rutter, as Executor ofthe Estate of Mildred Duncan, 
by counsel, and hereby notices an appeal from the final judgment entered by this Court on 
August 31, 2001. The plaintiff further certifies that there exists no transcript which needs to be 
ordered as Plaintiff appeals the Court's grant of Defendants' demurrer. 
0 
Temple W. Cabell, Esquire 
D. Hayden Fisher, Esquire 
SCHAFFER & CABELL, P.C. 
P.O. Box 507 
Richmond, Virginia 23218-0507 
(804) 648-0064 
Counsel for Plaintiff 
1 
CHARLES RUITER, as Executor 




Frank A. Edgar, Jr., Esquire 
WILCOX & SAVAGE, P.C. 
1800 Bank of America, N.A. 
Norfolk, Virginia 23510 
(757) 628-5566 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
2 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 
1. The trial Court erred in granting the defendants' demurrer where the plaintiff Charles 
Rutter, in his capacity as Executor of the estate of Mildred Duncan, filed a Motion 
for Judgment against the defendants which set forth facts that, if proven, demonstrate 
that the defendants committed actionable malpractice in drafting certain testamentary 
instruments for the late Mildred Duncan. 
64 
